A comprehensive look at how John Dewey's ethics can inform environmental issues.

This book treats values as the basis for all of philosophy, an approach distinct from critiquing theories of value and far rarer. “First Philosophy,” the effort to justify the foundations for a system of philosophy, is one of the main issues that divide philosophers today. McDonald’s philosophy of values is a comprehensive attempt to replace philosophies of “existence,” “being,” “experience,” the “subject,” or “language,” with a philosophy that locates value as most basic. This transformation is a radical move within Western (...) philosophy as a whole, since it has never been done in such a thoroughgoing way. Hugh P. McDonald makes a comprehensive case against first philosophy as metaphysical, by mounting a case against all metaphysical systems of philosophy. _Radical Axiology: A First Philosophy of Values _is a fresh start for a rebirth of philosophy. While other movements debate the “death of philosophy,” this book radically re-evaluates the direction of philosophy by discovering values at the basis of all philosophy. This reorientation addresses the question of what the love of wisdom can mean for us today. (shrink)

The growing literature on Environmental Ethics has ballooned into a separate sub-field within philosophy, involving ethical studies concerning the value of other species, of ecosystems, and of the environment of all living things as a whole. Some consider Environmental Ethics to be a revolution in ethics which will completely change the human-centered orientation of morals and reorient it to include all species, ecosystems or the larger biosphere. This volume explores pragmatist approaches to ethics that can be used for environmental issues. (...) Pragmatism may provide both a more defensible theory of non-anthropomorphic and intrinsic value than other ethical schools, and, more generally, supply an alternative model of what environmental philosophy could be. The holism of pragmatists constitutes a challenge to value and ethics centered in the individual, and a useful ground for more holistic theories of value which, some have argued, is more suitable to an environmental, as opposed to a humane, ethic. The authors of this book¿s chapters defend their understandings of pragmatism in the course of explaining contemporary ways to reconstruct central foundations to environmental ethics. (shrink)

In the recent literature of environmental ethics, certain criticisms of pragmatism in general and Dewey in particular have been made, specifically, that certain features of pragmatism make it unsuitable as an environmental ethic. Eric Katz asserts that pragmatism is an inherently anthropocentric and subjective philosophy. Bob Pepperman Taylor argues that Dewey’s naturalism in particular is anthropocentric in that it concentrates on human nature. I challenge both of these views in the context of Dewey’s naturalism. I discuss his naturalism, his critique (...) of subjectivity, his naturalization of intrinsic value, and his holistic treatment of justification. (shrink)

To bring our topic within manageable limits, the attempt will be made to approach the philosophy of nature in a systematic manner. Borrowing the quantitative categories of one, some and all, nature will be treated as first as singular, then a whole or totality and finally discussed in terms of various distinctions which set nature apart as a part. Past philosophic treatments will be discussed when germane to this treatment, as an example of a particular view of nature. I will (...) argue that nature is not a per se being, cannot be singular or the whole and that the various distinctions that separate the natural from other—the artificial, theconventional, etc.—are inadequate. (shrink)

In this essay, I will argue for the actuality of principles. Principles are normative in that they regulate the relation of actuality and potentiality as well as operate across time, from the past and present to the future. They may also apply across space, that is, that the same principle operates in different places in the same way, for example the laws of motion. Principles mean that change follows certain regularities. I will examine the modality of principles, the relation to (...) pluralism. I will argue negatively for the principle of principles, that is, that the world actually exhibits or contains principles. I will then argue that principles as origins cannot be accounted for by ontology. Principles are neither material nor substantial beings but both of the latter presume, as generals or “universals,” the actuality of principles. Thus principles could be considered in the category of “thirds” in Peirce. I will argue that principles also support James’s model of a “pluralistic universe” of change. (shrink)

This issue of Contemporary Pragmatism is devoted to pragmatism and environmental ethics. My introduction surveys the current situation at the intersection of these two fields, and the contributions of this issue's eleven articles.

Introduction -- Creative actualization -- Modes of value -- Moral justification -- Creative actualization and the world -- Critical evaluation of metaphysical value theories -- Critical evaluation of subjective value theories -- Critical evaluation of relational value theories -- Conclusion : value hierarchies and value autonomy.

I briefly discuss first philosophy (metaphysics), including different “paradigms’ of first philosophy in the history of Western philosophy. I then discuss the rise of environmental ethics as a new field of philosophy and the debate over anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric values. I suggest that ecocentric value theories could constitute a new first philosophy using the “paradigm” of value in first philosophy and why they should constitute a first philosophy.

In the recent literature of environmental ethics, certain criticisms of pragmatism in general and Dewey in particular have been made, specifically, that certain features of pragmatism make it unsuitable as an environmental ethic. Eric Katz asserts that pragmatism is an inherently anthropocentric and subjective philosophy. Bob Pepperman Taylor argues that Dewey’s naturalism in particular is anthropocentric in that it concentrates on human nature. I challenge both of these views in the context of Dewey’s naturalism. I discuss his naturalism, his critique (...) of subjectivity, his naturalization of intrinsic value, and his holistic treatment of justification. (shrink)

Environmental Philosophy: A Revaluation of Cosmopolitan Ethics from an Ecocentric Standpoint calls for a new approach to ethics. Starting from the necessity for all life of air, water, and food, the book revalues the relation of ethics and environmentalism. Using insights of the environmental ethicists, environmental ethics becomes the model for ethics as a whole. Humans are part of a larger environment. Cosmopolitanism should be revised in accord with environmental ethics. The book applies a new theory of values to the (...) relation of value and obligation, and of duty, rights and virtue, to accord with ecocentrism. The book also critically evaluates Utilitarianism and the self interest theory. Other chapters address population, species preservation and a practical program for environmental policy. (shrink)

This book is conceived as part of a systematic philosophy of values. Neither philosophies of value nor systematic philosophies are in fashion. It is hoped that this work will make a contribution toward their reappraisal. Classically, political philosophy was considered a part of philosophic systems, as the basic ideas of the philosophy applied to politics. Its relative neglect by the predominant school of philosophy in America and Britain has meant that certain ideas and issues in philosophy are in danger of (...) erasure by default. The neglect of political philosophy has meant, however, that ideologies dominate political discussion. The field of political discourse has, in effect, been yielded or ceded to the ideologues. Their views, concepts, statements of the issues, and solutions—in a word, the ultimate legitimacy of their approach—have been tacitly accepted. Many philosophers have never discussed ideology in relation to, and in the context of political philosophy in our time. More importantly, the connection between ideology and contemporary events has not received serious philosophic examination. One basis for this attitude may be the ideal of a "value free" social science. The well known thesis of Daniel Bell's book, "the end of ideology," has diverted attention from its study. Yet ideological politics is still with us in the form of ideologically defined political parties and political conflicts in which the ideology of the conflicting groups define the issues. Part I examines the link between ideology, totalitarianism and Plato’s ideal of the “philosopher-king.” Ideology is articulated by intellectuals seeking power, or attached to a party or faction seeking power. It is applied totalistically through bureaucracy and technology. We will go on in Part II to a critique of political essentialism. Essential models, combined with political motives and ideological formulas are the basis for total politicization. Thus totalitarianism will have been analyzed into root essential models, articulated into totalistic ideologies, by politically minded intellectuals, using a formula which politicizes all categories. Chapter five contrasts the moral values of political philosophy with the politicized standards of ideology. Chapter six contrasts the privacy and freedom requisite to evaluation of personal values, and to genuine happiness, with the total publicity of ideology. An entirely new grounding relation for politics is explicated in this book. (shrink)

This book evaluates competing theories on speculative topics, such as nature, technology, space, time, and the relation of mind and matter. The general thesis is the actuality of principles in the form of laws, norms and other general principles in a plastic world, tying together the actualization of “oughts” and other principles. The result is a pluralistic universe, endorsing the pragmatic view of the world. The book examines nature, being, reality and other traditional issues in this light, critically evaluating many (...) historical approaches. (shrink)

Mind cannot be reduced to "brain states" since "brain" is a reconstruction from experience. I begin with the "identity" view and then consider less reductive physicalist views. I criticize the dualistic view, and argue for unique features of mind that separate it from anything physical, particularly perspective. I then argue for Mead's view of the formation and development of mind in a social context. The plasticity of minds, along with privacy of experience argue against identification with any physical correlate. I (...) conclude with a plea for pragmatic pluralism, supported by modern science, as superior to reductionisms. (shrink)